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Abstract. Consumer cooperatives represent a highly successful example of democratic
form of enterprises operating in developed countries. They are usually medium to large-
scale companies competing with the prot-maximizing rms in the retail sector. This paper
describes this situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer cooperatives maximize the
utility of consumer-members and, in return, refund them with a share of the prots corre-
sponding to the ratio of their individual spending to the cooperatives total sales. We show
that when consumers possess quasi-linear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically di¤er-
entiated goods, and companies operate using a linear technology, the presence of consumer
cooperatives positively a¤ects total industry output, as well as welfare. The e¤ect of coop-
eratives on welfare proves to be even more signicant when goods are either complements
or highly di¤erentiated, and when competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand.
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1. Introduction
Since 1844, the idea of cooperation as rstly presented by the Rochdale Society of Equi-
table Pioneers has spread around the world and, today, more than 700 million co-operators
are active throughout 100 countries (ICA 2006). Consumer cooperatives (henceforth Coops)
represent one of the most successful examples of democratic and participative forms of en-
terprises, ably competing with the well-established and conventional for-prot rms. Among
the various cooperative forms of enterprises, Coops are rms that operate in the retail sector
with the aim of acting on behalf of their consumer-members. These are usually entitled to
elect their representatives who participate in assemblies and hire the (professional or non-
professional) managers running the rm. In large Coops the assembly elects a board of
directors that, on its behalf, supervises the managers.
Throughout their history (see Finch, Trombley & Rabas 1998, for a brief account of
the US case) Coops have become well-established in several countries without, in general,
holding a dominant market position. There are, however, a few exceptions to this, namely
in Switzerland, Finland, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Italy. Coops in Switzerland have a
long tradition, with its two main groups (Migros and Coop) accounting for approximately 4.5
million members and a turnover of 27.4 billion euro. In Finland, compared to the population,
there are proportionately more cooperative members than in any other country in the world,
totalling 6.9 million. Finnish Coops have an estimated turnover of 11 billion euro (EuroCoop
2009). Japan also boasts a very signicant consumer cooperative movement with over 25.8
million members, achieving a turnover of approximately 38,365 billion US dollar in 2009
(JCCU, 2009). Meanwhile, today, Italys largest group of consumer cooperatives successfully
competes with the large private retail chains. Among the top 30 Italian retail rms, 9 are
consumer cooperatives, with more than 7 million consumer-members and a recorded turnover
of about 12.9 billion euro in 2009, corresponding to around 18% of total Italian market share
(E-coop 2010).
For Europe as a whole, the European Association of Consumer Cooperatives estimates
that there are approximately 3,200 consumer cooperatives (with a total turnover of 70 billion
euro), employing 300,000 workers and serving about 25 million consumer-members (Euro-
Coop 2008).
Up to now, the economic literature on consumer cooperatives has mainly focused on the
behaviour of these rms under monopoly, perfect or monopolistic competition.1 However, in
developed countries, the retail industry is characterized more and more by large-scale rms,
e.g. the Cooperative Group in the UK with its wide range of retail and nancial services.
Therefore, we are seeing that modern Coops are competing increasingly on a oligopolistic
level with conventional prot-maximizing rms (henceforth PMFs), giving rise to a specic
example of a mixed oligopoly.2
1See. Bekenstein (1943), Enke (1945), Yamey (1950), Anderson, Porter & Maurice (1979) and (1980),
Ireland & Law (1983), Sexton (1983), Sexton & Sexton (1987), Farrell (1985), and more recently, Hart &
Moore (1996) and (1998), Kelsey & Milne (2010), Mikami (2003) and (2010).
2The term mixed oligopolyis usually adopted to describe a market in which one or more publicly-owned
rms compete against PMFs on an oligopolistic level. Publicly-owned rms are thought to maximize social
welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer and producer surplus (see De Fraja & Delbono 1990, Corneo & Jeanne
1994). Alternatively, we can understand a publicly-owned rm as one nanced directly by all consumers
through income tax. As a result, the marginal-cost pricing is only attained in the special case in which the
income of the median voter equals the average income (Corneo 1997).
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature specically dealing with a mixed
oligopoly between Coops and PMFs, with the exception of Kelsey & Milne (2008) and
Goering (2008). The former examine the e¤ects of the presence of consumer-shareholders
on company decision-making under both a monopoly and oligopoly. They show that the
presence of consumers among company stakeholders may be of strategic advantage and may,
ultimately, increase company prot. In their model, consumers have non-zero mass and act
strategically. In contrast, in our model, Coops compete with pure PMFs in a di¤erentiated
oligopoly. Moreover, Coops maximize the utility of a representative consumer, assumed
atomistic, and therefore, solely interested in his/her consumer surplus. On the other hand,
Goering presents a homogeneous goods duopoly between a PMF and a non-prot company
maximizing a parametric combination of prot and consumer surplus, assumed exogenously.3
A wide range of related papers deals with labour-managed rms à la Ward (1958) and
Vanek (1970) assumed to be competing with PMFs under a duopoly with homogenous or
di¤erentiated goods (see Law & Stewart 1983, Okuguchi 1986, Cremer & Cremér 1992).
Furthermore, some recent contributions model the behaviour of agricultural cooperatives
under either an imperfect competition or mixed duopoly, with homogeneous or vertically
di¤erentiated goods.4 In general, in the above models, labour-managed rms and farmer-
cooperatives are not assumed to act on behalf of consumers. In the typical labour-managed
rm described in the literature, worker-members are assumed to maximize per-worker added
value, thus, implying that labour-managed rms set their output more restrictively com-
pared to standard prot-maximizing rms. On the other hand, agriculture cooperatives are
generally modelled as rms using the input received from their farmer-members to deliver
end goods to consumers. This implies that agriculture cooperatives have an incentive to
over-produce, since farmers do not internalize their production externality on the nal mar-
ket price. However, strong similarities with consumer cooperatives arise when agriculture
cooperatives purchase input on behalf of their members. This is due to the fact that they
are competing with prot-maximizing rms in selling input to farmers, who are acting as
consumers. Empirically, the presence of agriculture cooperatives increases sales and reduces
prices on input markets, breaking existing monopsonies (Hansmann, 1996). Therefore, in
this respect, some of the results of this paper may also be applied to agriculture cooperatives
selling input to farmers.
In this paper, we represent a Coop as a company which maximizes the utility of a represen-
tative (atomistic) consumer buying goods and receiving a share of the prots proportional
to the ratio of his/her individual spending to the cooperatives total sales.5 As a result,
every Coop is shown to set a price equal to its average production cost, hence a¤ecting the
equilibrium behaviour of rival PMFs. All rms are assumed to possess a constant return-of-
scale technology, and, therefore, in equilibrium, every Coop sets a price equal to its constant
marginal cost. The marginal cost pricing rule emerges endogenously in our model. This
pricing rule renders our results comparable to those obtained in mixed oligopoly models
with state-owned rms and PMFs (Cremèr, Marchand & Thisse 1989, De Fraja & Delbono
1989). Moreover, the constant average cost assumption results in overcoming the traditional
3Kopel, Lö­ er and Marini (2010) explore the e¤ects arising when consumers delegate a manager to
maximize a weighted sum of their aggregate utilities and prots.
4See Rodhes (1983), Fulton (1989), Sexton (1990), Tennbakk (1992), Albaek & Schultz (1998), Fulton &
Giannakas (2001) and Pennerstorfer & Weiss (2007).
5In Coops this share takes the form of a patronage rebateapplied to consumer-member purchases.
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problem of Coop membership instability.6 At the end of the paper, we briey consider the
e¤ects that may occur assuming increasing marginal costs.
The main purpose of this paper is to present a detailed taxonomy of the results obtained in
an oligopoly in which an arbitrary number of PMFs and Coops compete strategically either
in quantities or in prices and goods are di¤erentiated. We show that, under consumer quasi-
linear preferences, the presence of Coops in the market positively a¤ects both the total output
and welfare (and market prices negatively). Under the Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous
goods, it can be shown that the presence of Coops pushes all PMFs out of the market
or, alternatively, forces them to behave as perfectly competitive rms, thus, maximizing
social welfare. When, instead, goods are di¤erentiated, the Coop e¤ect on welfare proves to
be more signicant when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated, and when
competition is à la Cournot rather than à la Bertrand. Based on the above results, we
should expect consumer cooperatives to be present more often in markets exhibiting such
features.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Sections 3 and 4 present
the main results under a mixed oligopoly with quantity and price competition; and Section
5 contains our concluding remarks.
2. The Model
2.1. Consumer Preferences. The demand side of the market is represented by a contin-
uum of atomistic consumers, i 2 I, whose mass is normalized to one, i.e. I = [0; 1]. Every
consumer is assumed to possess quasi-linear preferences dened on (n+ 1) commodities, n
symmetrically di¤erentiated goods7 xk (k = 1; :::; n) and a numeraire y, expressed by the
following utility function Ui : Rn+1+ ! R+
(2.1) Ui
 
xi1; x
i
2; :; x
i
k;::; x
i
n; y
i

= ui
 
xi1; x
i
2; :; x
i
k;::; x
i
n

+ yi
where xik;and y
i denote the individual consumption of these goods. Let ui (:) be smooth,
increasing and strictly concave in all xik;
8
If the available income of each i-th consumer (denoted by yi) is su¢ ciently high, every
individual inverse demand can be obtained from the rst-order conditions of the problem
maximization (2.1) subject to budget constraint
(2.2)
nX
k=1
pk (x1; :; xn)x
i
k + y
i  yi;
as
(2.3) pk =
@ui (x
i
1; x
i
2; :; x
i
n)
@xik
; for xik > 0 and k = 1; 2; :::n:
In (2.2) the price of good xk depends on the prole of quantities (x1; :; xn) (the market is a
oligopoly) and not on every individual purchase xik of the good.
6See Anderson, Maurice & Porter (1979), Sandler & Tschirhart (1981), Sexton (1983) and Sexton & Sexton
(11987). In our paper all consumers buy Coop goods and are, therefore, entitled to become members. This
assumption is in line with the typical "open door" principle of cooperatives. Moreover, given the constant-
return-of-scale technology, Coop e¢ ciency cannot be a¤ected by favouring the entry or the exit of members.
7A good here may also be interpreted as a bundle of goods sold by every rm in the market.
8The Hessian of Ui is negative semidenite for all (xi1; x
i
2; :; x
i
n) 2 Rn+.
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2.2. Industry. The retail industry consists of n rms supplying n di¤erentiated goods (or
bundles of goods), whose m are supplied by consumer cooperatives and (n m) by tradi-
tional prot-maximizing rms. Let M  N denote the set of all Coops and NnM the set of
all PMFs. Normally, PMFs are assumed to maximize their prot
(2.4) k (x1; x2; ::; xn) = pk (x1; x2; :::xn)xk   ck(xk):
In general we will assume linear variable costs and zero xed costs for all rms. As expected,
Coops act on behalf of atomistic consumers, and every consumer is assumed to receive a share
of the Coops net prot proportional to the amount of goods purchased over the Coops total
sales. This can be expressed by the following objective-function for a Coop j 2M ,9
(2.5)
8>><>>:
max
xij
ui
 
xi1; x
i
2; :; x
i
k;::; x
i
n

+ yi s.t
nP
k=1
pk (x1; :; xn)x
i
k + y
i  yi + P
j2M
xij
xj
[pj (x1; :; xn)xj   cj (xj)] :
The problem (2.5) reduces to
(2.6) max
xij
(
ui
 
xi1; x
i
2;; ::; x
i
n

+ yi   P
j2M
cj (xj)
xj
xij  
P
k2NnM
pk (x1; :; xn)x
i
k
)
and, the FOC for interior maximum of (2.6) for every j 2M can be written as
(2.7)
@ui (x
i
1; ::; x
i
n)
@xij
=
cj(xj)
xj
for xj > 0.
as long as the price charged by a j-th Coop is su¢ ciently high to generate non-negative
prots, namely, for pj (x1; :xn)  cj(xj)xj . Expression (2.7) indicates that a Coop acting on
behalf of atomistic consumers sets its quantity to equate every consumers willingness to
pay for good j at its average cost, so as to distribute the maximum consumer surplus to
consumer-members (which are all consumers here).
Once (2.7) is respected for every single consumer, the Coop aggregates it for all consumers
i 2 I, obtaining
(2.8)
@u (x1; ::; xn)
@xj
=
cj(xj)
xj
for xj > 0.
Since all rms possess a constant-return-of-scale technology, every Coop makes the total
consumer willingness to pay for good j equal to marginal cost.10
3. Oligopoly with Quantity Competition
In order to study the implications of the simultaneous presence of both PMFs and Coops
in an oligopolistic market, let the following utility function represent the preferences of a
i-th consumer in the economy:11
9Note that when prices instead of quantities are rm choice variables, PMF and Coop payo¤s can be
expressed as a function of a price vector (p1; p2; ::pn).
10Coop behaviour would be di¤erent if assumed to act on behalf of all consumers together. In this case,
consumers could coordinate their actions to a¤ect the prices of all goods in the market.
11See Shubik & Levitan (1971), Vives (1984) and Dixit (1983) for further details on this utility
specication.
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(3.1) Ui (x1; x2;; ::; xn; y) = 
nX
k=1
xik   (1=2)
"
nX
k=1
 
xik
2
+ 
nX
k=1
xik
X
r 6=k
xir
#
+ yi
where  > 0 and  2 (1=(1  n); 1] represents the degree of product di¤erentiation. For
 = 0, goods are independent and for  = 1 goods are perfect substitutes. Moreover, for
 < 0 goods become complements.12
Let also all rms k = 1; 2; :::n possess identical strategy sets Xk = [0;1) and identical
technology, expressed by a linear cost function, ck (xk) = cxk with 0 < c < .
By (3.1) and (2.3), the following individual linear inverse demand for every good k =
1; 2; ::; n is obtained
(3.2)   xik   
X
h 6=k
xih = pk for x
i
k > 0:
Inverse market demand for one good can simply be obtained by integrating (3.2) over all
consumers i 2 I. Moreover, the FOC of problem (2.6) yields the following FOC for every
Coop producing the j-th good
(3.3)   xij   
X
h 6=j
xih = c.
Expression (3.3) is the FOC of a Coop acting on behalf of one atomistic consumer buying
its product. A Coop will decide its own market quantity aggregating (3.3) for all consumers.
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Oligopoly with all PMFs. We begin by illustrating the
case in which all rms are PMFs and the choice variables are quantities. If rms are PMFs,
they simply maximize their prots concerning the quantity of the k-th good,
(3.4) k (x1; x2; :::; xn) = (  xk   
X
r 6=k
xr)xk   cxk:
Solving this simple maximization problem yields the following best-replies for each k-th
PMF,
xk (x k) =
1
2
(  x k   c)
where x k = (x1; x2; ::; xk 1; xk+1; ::; xn), and therefore pure-PMF Nash equilibrium quan-
tities (x1; x2; :::; xn) are easily obtained as
(3.5) xk =
(  c)
2 +  (n  1)
for k = 1; 2; ::; n and prices are given by
pk (x1; :; xn) =
+ c+ c (n  1)
 (n  1) + 2 :
12For  = 1=(1  n) most of equilibrium quantities and prices under Cournot and Bertrand competition
become indenite. This is why, in what follows, we assume  2 (1=(1  n); 1].
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It is made evident by (3.5) that for  = 1 the usual Cournot solution with homogenous
goods (xk = (  c) = (n+ 1)) occurs, while for  = 0 goods are independent and all PMFs
act monopolistically (xk = (  c) =2).
3.2. Mixed Cournot Oligopoly. Let us assume that a group of m rms in the market
(m  n) convert to Coops accepting all consumers as their members. The market, thus,
becomes a mixed oligopoly where m Coops compete against (n m) traditional PMFs.
By aggregating (3.3) for all consumers and di¤erentiating (3.4), the following best-responses
are obtained, respectively,
(3.6) xj(
P
h2NnM
xh;
P
r2Mnfjg
xr) =   
P
h2NnM
xh   
P
r2Mnfjg
xr   c,
8j 2M;
(3.7) xh(
P
j2M
xj;
P
g2(NnM)nfhg
xg) =
  P
j2M
xj   
P
g2(NnM)nfhg
xg   c
2
,
8h 2 NnM .
Exploiting the symmetry of the m Coop and of the (n  m) PMFs, the following mixed
oligopoly Nash equilibrium quantities are obtained for every Coop
(3.8) xj =
(2  ) (  c)
2 + (n+m  3)    (n  1) 2 8j 2M;
and every PMF
(3.9) xh =
(1  ) (  c)
2 + (n+m  3)    (n  1) 2 8h 2 NnM;
with corresponding equilibrium prices
pj (x

1; x

2; ::; x

n) = c
for every Coop and
ph (x

1; x

2; :; x

n) =
+ c   ( (m+ 1)  c (2m+ n  2)) + 2 (m  c (n+m  1))
2 +  (n+m  3)  2(n  1)
for every PMF, respectively.
It can be proved that, in general, if goods are perfect substitutes ( = 1) the model yields
the extreme prediction that the presence of even just one Coop in the market pushes PMFs
out of the market.13 This could, alternatively, be interpreted as if the presence of Coops
forces all PMFs to adopt a perfectly competitive behaviour in order to remain in the market.
Either way, as the equilibrium price coincides with all the average and marginal costs of the
13Alternatively, one could assume that Coops are less e¢ cient than PMFs or that PMFs enjoy some sort
of cost advantage. In this case both types of rms can co-exist also when goods are perfectly homogeneous.
(see for instance Cremer, Marchand & Thisse, 1998).
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rm, each consumers willingness to pay for the homogeneous good is equal to every rms
marginal production cost, thus, implying welfare maximization (since u0 = c).
As an additional observation, please note that the total market output under mixed
oligopoly X =
P
k=1;::;nx

k is equal to
(3.10) X = mxj + (n m)xh =
(  c) (n(1  ) +m)
2 + (n+m  3)    (n  1) 2 :
For m = 0 the above expression coincides with pure n-PMF oligopoly
(3.11) X(m = 0) =
n (  c)
2 +  (n  1)
and for m = n the expression turns into pure n-Coop total quantity, with
(3.12) X(m = n) =
n (  c)
1 +  (n  1) :
From (3.11) and (3.12) pure Coop oligopoly clearly yields higher output than pure PMF
oligopoly. Moreover, expression (3.10) makes it clear that under a mixed oligopoly the total
output increases monotonically with the number of active Coops in the market.
The next proposition compares rm output obtained in pure PMF and mixed oligopolies
under competition in quantities.
Proposition 1. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities, for  2 (1=(1  n); 1] Coop output is
always greater than PMF output, namely, xj > x

h for all j 2 M and h 2 NnM . Moreover,
the output obtained by a rm in a pure PMF oligopoly is lower (higher) than the output of a
Coop (PMF) in a mixed oligopoly, namely, xj > xk  xh.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
3.3. Welfare Analysis: PMFs vs. Mixed Oligopoly. The analysis of social welfare
under a mixed oligopoly with di¤erentiated goods requires a careful calculation of the inter-
acting e¤ects of the Coopsand PMFssimultaneous presence regarding consumer surplus
and prots in all markets. Using the properties of quasi-linear preferences, consumer wel-
fare can be measured by using consumer surplus which, in turn, corresponds to the value of
consumer utilities.
Under a pure PMF oligopoly, for all k-th goods produced, total welfare (TWk) can be
computed as the sum of consumer surplus plus rm prots,
TW PMFk =
1Z
0
Ui
 
xi1 (t) ; :; x
i
n (t) ; y
i (t)

dt  pk (x1; :; xn)xk + pk (x1; :; xn)xk   cxk =
= U (x1; x2;; ::; xn)  cxk + y:
Adding up the welfare generated in all n markets and using (3.1) to obtain the utility
functions aggregated for all consumers, we have
TW PMF = (  c)Pnk=1xk   (1=2) hPni=1 (xk)2 + Pnk=1xkPr 6=kxri+ y;
which, by the symmetry of all rms, can be written as
(3.13) TW PMF = (  c)n  xk   (1=2)

n (xk)
2 + n(n  1)x2k

+ y:
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In a mixed oligopoly, total welfare generated in all markets managed by a j-th Coop is given
by the area below the demand function and above the marginal cost function,
(3.14) TWCOOPj =
xjZ
0
pj()d   cxj ;
which using (3.1), (3.14) can be simply expressed as
TWCOOPj =
P
j2M
(  c)  xj   (1=2)
" P
j2M
 
xj
2
+ 
P
j2M
xj
P
r 6=jx

r
#
:
Finally, total welfare under a mixed oligopoly can be expressed asX
h2NnM
TW PMFh +
X
j2M
TWCOOPj =
=
P
h2NnM
(  c)xh   (1=2)
" P
h2NnM
(xh)
2 + 
P
h2NnM
xh
P
r 6=hx

r
#
+
+
P
j2M
(  c)xj   (1=2)
" P
j2M
 
xj
2
+ 
P
j2M
xj
P
r 6=jx

r
#
+ y:
Now, plugging (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) into the above expressions, we obtain the following
values for total welfare (see Appendix),
(3.15) TW PMF =
1
2
n (  c)2 (3 +  (n  1))
(2 +  (n  1))2 + y;
under pure PMF oligopoly
(3.16) TWCOOP =
1
2
n (  c)2
(1 +  (n  1)) + ey
pure Coop oligopoly
(3.17) TWMO = 1
2
(n m)( c)2(1 )(3+(n+m 4) 2(n 1))
(2+(n+m 3) 2(n 1))2| {z }P
h2NnM
TWh
+ 1
2
m( c)2(2 )
2+(n+m 3) 2(n 1)| {z }P
j2M
TWj
+ y:
and mixed oligopoly with m Coops and (n m) PMFs, respectively.
Expression (3.17) illustrates that social welfare in a mixed oligopoly accounts for the sum
of welfare yielded in (n m) markets in which PMFs produce plus welfare yielded in m
markets in which Coops are, in turn, active.
The analysis of (3.17) shows that the presence of Coops can be relatively more benecial
in some circumstances than in others and, in particular, for specic levels of product di¤er-
entiation. Figure 1 reveals that in terms of total welfare, a pure Coop duopoly (continuous
line) out-performs both a pure PMF duopoly and a mixed duopoly for any degree of goods
di¤erentiation which is obvious, considering that a pure Coop basically acts as a welfare
maximizer.
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Figure 1 - Cournot competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly total welfare (dotted line), for (  c) = 1 and  = [ 0:5; 1] :
Under a mixed duopoly (dotted line) for  = 1 (homogeneous goods), only the Coop
remains in the market and welfare is, therefore, maximized. Moreover, we can note that
the relative e¢ ciency of a mixed market versus a pure PMF market (circled line) is higher
when goods are either complements ( < 0) or highly di¤erentiated. When goods become
increasingly homogeneous, the welfare loss determined in a pure PMF versus a mixed duopoly
or a pure Coop duopoly decreases progressively but never disappears. Similarly, a mixed
duopoly increasingly approximates maximum social welfare for increasingly substitute goods.
10.750.50.250
1.75
1.5
1.25
1
0.75
0.5
beta
T W
Figure 2 - Cournot competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
triopoly total welfare with m = 1 (dotted line), m = 2 (squared line), for (  c) = 1 and
 = [ 0:1; 1].
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The results illustrated in gure 1 still hold for more than two rms that compete à la
Cournot (see gure 2). Moreover, it can be proven that the entry of new Coops in the
market is always an advantage for social welfare.
Proposition 2. Social welfare under mixed oligopoly increases with the number of m Coops
regardless of the number of n rms active in the market.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The positive e¤ect of Coops on welfare still holds true when the total number of rms in
the market increases. Figure 3 illustrates that the entry of new rms, boosting competition,
always exerts a favourable impact on market welfare. Consequently, if the new entrants are
Coops, this impact is even stronger. Consumers should therefore exert pressure on respective
Coops to set up new selling units, thus, increasing competition and welfare.14
5037.52512.5
2.25
2
1.75
1.5
1.25
1
0.75
0.5
n
T W
Fig. 3 - Cournot Oligopoly: Mixed Oligopoly welfare for m = n
4
(squared line), m = 2
3
n (dotted
line), and m = n (optimum) (continuous line) for  = 0:2, (a  c) = 1, n = 1; 2; ::; 50.
However, a simple comparison shows that when goods are substitutes ( > 0), the welfare
raised by a pure Coop oligopoly becomes less and less advantageous compared to a pure
PMF oligopoly when both n and  increase. When competition is high (which happens for
high n and ) the di¤erent forms of market do not perform so di¤erently and, thus,welfare
is not so dissimilar. See next proposition.
Proposition 3. When the total number of rms in the market increases (higher n) and goods
become increasingly substitute (higher ), the welfare ratio  (; n) = TWCOOP=TWPMF
decreases monotonically within the interval (1; 4=3].
Proof. See the Appendix. 
14It would be interesting to model the entry of di¤erent types of rms (Coops and PMFs) in an endogenous
timing model in which rms can decide to take an earlier or later move to enter the market (Hamilton &
Slutsky, 1990). In this case, we could assess which specic timing conguration would maximize market
welfare.
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Figure 4 shows that when the number of rms increases and goods become increasingly
homogeneous, the ratio measuring the relative advantage yielded by Coops vs. PMFs in
terms of welfare, progressively falls, approaching its lower bound. Therefore, if Coops aspire
to match consumer needs, we should see these types of rms more frequently in highly
monopolistic markets in which goods are either highly di¤erentiated or complements.
5037.52512.5
1.35
1.3
1.25
1.2
1.15
1.1
1.05
n
T W rat io
Fig. 4 - Values of (; n) for  = 1 (contnuous thin line),  = 0:5 (circled line),  = 0:1 (dotted
line),  = 0:05 (squared line),  = 0 (thick dashed line), for (a  c) = 1 and n = 1; 2; ::50.
In the next section, we will consider the case of price competition.
4. Price Competition
It would be interesting to compare the case of quantity competition to that of price
competition so as to verify whether di¤erences arise. An obvious di¤erence is that, when
goods are perfectly homogeneous, Bertrand competition exhibits the extreme prediction that
rm set prices equal to marginal cost, regardless of the objective functions of rms competing
in the market.
4.1. Oligopoly with all PMFs. When all rms are PMFs, we rst obtain the direct
demand for each k-th good as a price function,
xk (p1; p2; ::; pn) =
 (1  )  pk   (n  2)pk + 
P
h 6=k ph
(1  ) ((n  1) + 1)
for k = 1; 2; ::; n and  6= 1.15
As a result, all PMF prot function can be written as
(4.1) k (p1; :; pn) = (pk   c)xk (p1; p2; ::; pn) :
15Since demands are not dened for  = 1, output level under homogeneous goods are simply dened as
rm direct demands for prices equal to marginal costs.
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Di¤erentiating (4.1) with respect to pk yields the best-response of every k-th PMF as
pk(p k) =
1
2
 (1  ) + c (n  2)  + c+ p k
 (n  2) + 1
where p k = (p1; p2; ::; pk 1; pk+1; ::; pn).
By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium price of every k-th PMF can be obtained as
(4.2)
8>><>>:
pk =
( (1  ) + c (n  2) + c)
 (n  3) + 2 for  6= 1
pk = c for  = 1;
with associated quantities:
(4.3)
8>>><>>>:
xk (p1; p2; ::; pn) =
(  c) (1 +  (n  2))
(1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3)) for  6= 1
xk (p1; p2; ::; pn) =
(  c)
n
for  = 1:
:
4.2. Mixed Oligopoly with Price Competition. Again we assume that m  n rms
start behaving as Coops. By (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain the following direct demands for a
PMF h 2 NnM , given the price charged by other rms,
(4.4) xh (p1; :; pn) =
 (1  )  ph   (n  2)ph + 
P
r2(NnM)nh
pr +mc
(1  ) (1 + (n  1))
and the price charged by a Coop j 2M
(4.5) xj (p1; :; pn) =
 (1  )  c  (n m  1)c+  P
h2NnM
ph
(1  ) (1 + (n  1))
for  6= 1.
By (4.4) we can put the prot-function of a PMF as a function of prices,
h (p1; :; pn) = (ph   c)xh (p1; :; pn)
and, after straightforward calculations, the following mixed oligopoly equilibrium prices are
obtained
(4.6)
8>><>>:
ph =
 (1  ) + c (1 +  (n+m  2))
2 +  (n+m  3) for  6= 1
ph = c for  = 1
and
pj = c
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with associated quantities
(4.7) xh (p1; p

2; ::; p

n) =
(  c) (1 +  (n  2))
(1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n+m  3))
for every PMF and
(4.8) xj (p1; p

2; ::; p

n) =
(  c) (2 +  (2n  3))
(1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n+m  3)) ;
for every Coop, respectively, for  6= 1 and
xh (p

1; :; p

n) = xj (p

1; :; p

n) =
(  c)
n
for  = 1.
All results regarding prices and outputs under Bertrand competition are condensed into
the next two propositions.
Proposition 4. Under price competition: (i) for  2 [0; 1], mixed oligopoly prices are for
all rms either lower than or equal to pure PMF oligopoly prices, namely, pk  ph  pj for
every j 2 M , h 2 NnM and k = 1; 2; ::n. (ii) For  2 (1=(1  n); 0), pure PMF oligopoly
prices are higher (lower) than Coop (PMF) mixed oligopoly prices, namely, ph > pk > p

j .
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 5. Under price competition: (i) for  2 [0; 1], Coop (PMF) mixed oligopoly
output is higher (lower) than or equal to pure PMF oligopoly output, namely, xj (p) 
xk (p)  xh (p). (ii) For  2 (1=(1  n); 0), PMF mixed oligopoly output is higher (lower)
than pure PMF oligopoly (Coop mixed oligopoly) output, namely, xj (p) > xh (p) > xk (p).
Proof. See the Appendix 
Under price competition, the positive e¤ect of Coops on output is even more marked than
under quantity competition. This is particularly true when goods are complements, as also
PMFs expand their output more than under a pure PMF oligopoly. (see proposition 5, point
(ii)).
4.3. Welfare Comparison under Price Competition. For the sake of briefness, all cal-
culations for total welfare under price competition can be found in the Appendix. The results
of these calculations, which are not so di¤erent to those obtained in the case of quantity com-
petition, are reported here. Total welfare under a mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary number
of PMFs and Coops competing in prices is obtained as
(4.9) TWMO = 1
2
(n m)( c)2(3+(n+m 4))(1+(n 2))
(2+(n+m 3))2(1+(n 1))| {z }P
h2NnM TWh
+ 1
2
m( c)2(2+(2n 3))
(1+(n 1))(2+(n+m 3))| {z }P
j2M TWj
Setting m = 0 in (4.9) we can obtain pure PMF oligopoly total welfare as
TW PMF =
1
2
n (  c)2 (1 +  (n  2)) (3 +  (n  4))
(1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))2 ;
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while, by setting n = m, we have the pure Coop total welfare as
TWCOOP =
1
2
(  c)2 n
(1 +  (n  1))2 :
The pure Coop oligopoly always yields optimum social welfare, under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition. When plotting social welfare under price competition, no particular
di¤erences emerge regarding the case of quantity competition, except that, when goods are
perfectly homogeneous (i.e.,  = 1), all rms behave in exactly the same way by setting their
prices equal to their marginal costs.
10.750.50.250-0.25-0.5
2
1.75
1.5
1.25
1
0.75
0.5
beta
T W
Figure 5- Bertrand competition: pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and
mixed duopoly total welfare (dotted line), for (  c) = 1 and  = [ 0:5; 1] :
Under both quantity competition and price competition, social welfare increases with the
number of Coops. A proposition analogue to proposition 2 is presented below.
Proposition 6. Social welfare under mixed oligopoly and price competition increases with
the number of m Coops regardless of the number of n rms active on the market.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
An important di¤erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition emerges in terms of
welfare loss for a pure PMF oligopoly versus a pure Coop oligopoly. As shown in Figure 6,
the loss is denitively larger for quantity compared to price competition and the di¤erence is
particularly high when goods are highly homogeneous. This is the case where the presence
of at least one Coop in the market is denitively more benecial under Cournot than un-
der Bertrand competition. Additional welfare comparisons between Cournot and Bertrand
oligopolies are provided in the Appendix.
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10.750.50.250-0.25-0.5
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1.5
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0.5
beta
TW
Fig.6- Total welfare in a pure PMF duopoly under Cournot (circled line) and Bertrand
compettion (dotted line) compared to a pure Co-op market (continuous line) for (a  c) = 1 and
 2 [ 0:5; 1] :
5. Concluding Remarks
Although consumer cooperatives are, in general, well-established in several countries, their
behaviour is still largely unknown and requires additional research, notably to identify the
e¤ects of the strategic interaction between consumer cooperatives and traditional prot-
maximizing rms in oligopolistic markets. This paper has attempted to take a rst step in
this direction, showing the main e¤ects arising in a mixed oligopoly with prot-maximizing
rms and consumer cooperatives competing either à la Cournot or à la Bertrand in markets
with heterogeneous goods. We have shown that the presence of Coops is particularly bene-
cial for industry output and social welfare in mainly two cases. The rst is under Cournot
competition and homogeneous goods. In this case, Coops expand their output and grow
to the extent to push PMFs out of the market, or if interpreted di¤erently, force them to
behave as perfectly competitive rms setting a price equal to the marginal cost and making
zero prot as a result. Instead, the second case arises when market competition is relatively
weak, namely, when goods are either complements or highly di¤erentiated and the presence
of Coops appears to be particularly valuable, considerably increasing output and welfare. In
this paper, we have also shown that Coops a¤ect total welfare more under Cournot rather
than under Bertrand competition. Therefore, according to our model, consumer cooper-
atives are likely to behave not so di¤erently to traditional prot-maximizing rms in all
the retail markets in which goods are highly (but not fully) homogeneous and competition
occurs mostly in price. As a reaction to these market forces, Coops may attempt to pro-
pose genuinely di¤erentiated goods to their customers and, consequently, enhance consumer
welfare.
Some of the results of this paper call for further analysis. First of all, throughout the paper
we have assumed a constant return-of-scale technology for rms. Some of the recent liter-
ature on mixed oligopoly has assumed increasing returns-of-scale, thus, implying increasing
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marginal costs. In this case, a Coop, with its typical output expanding behaviour, could
prove endogenously less e¢ cient than a PMF, and so impose negative externality on the
society it operates in. This e¤ect would be overturned if a Coop were managed jointly by all
consumers or by someone acting on their behalf. In such a case, consumers would no longer
be atomistic and could promote welfare-enhancing pricing strategies, a¤ecting, to consumer
advantage, the rival PMFs pricing policies. Developing a consumer cooperative model in
which consumers are organized into coalitions to act strategically in their interests, may well
be a topic of great interest for future research.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The rst result can be easily checked by the direct inspection
of expressions (3.8) and (3.9). Note that for  = 1, it occurs that
(6.1)
(
xj( = 1) =
  c
m
xh( = 1) = 0;
implying that when goods are homogeneous, only Coops remain active in a mixed oligopoly
market. In this case, the economy total output is given byP
j2M
xj +
P
h2NnM
xh = m
  c
m
+ 0 = (  c) >P
k
xk = n (  c) = (n+ 1) :
The second result can be proved by noting that, for all j 2M and k 2 N ,
(6.2) xj   xk =
( (n m  1) + 2) (  c)
( (n+m  3)  2(n  1) + 2) ( (n  1) + 2)
and expression (6.2) is always strictly positive for  2 (1=(1  n); 1] and n  2.
Finally, for all h 2 NnM
xk   xh =
(  c)
2 +  (n  1)  
(  c) (1  )
2 +  (n+m)  2 (n  1)  3
is equal to zero for  = 0, since xk( = 0) = xh( = 0) = (  c) =2. Straightforward
manipulations show that for  6= 0
xk   xh =
(  c)m
((n+m  3) + 2 (1  n) + 2) (n (   1) + 2) > 0
if  
(n+m  3) + 2 (1  n) + 2 > 0
which is always satised for  2 (1=1  n; 0) and  2 (0; 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By inspecting (3.17), it can be observed that the welfare raised
by a Coop is higher than the welfare raised by a PMF whenever
(2  ) (2 +  (n+m  4)  2 (n  1))
(2 +  (n+m  3)  2 (n  1))2
>
(1  ) (3 +  (n+m  4)  2 (n  1))
(2 +  (n+m  3)  2 (n  1))2
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which implies
(2  )  2 +  (n+m  3)  2 (n  1) >
> (1  )  3 +  (n+m  4)  2 (n  1) ;
and then
(1  )2 + (2  )   (n+m  3)  2 (n  1) >
> (1  )   (n+m  3)  2 (n  1)
which always holds for m  n and  2 (1=(1  n); 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Straightforward manipulations of (3.15) and (3.16) show that
(n; ) =
TWCOOP
TW PMF
=
(2 +  (n  1))2
(3 +  (n  1)) (1 +  (n  1))
and for  2 [0; 1] the above ratio decreases monotonically both in n (for n  1) and in
 (for   0) within the interval (1; 4=3]. For  = 0, it reaches the value of  (n; 0) =
4=3, that it is also obtained under monopoly (n = 1). For  = 1,  reaches the value of
 (n; 1) = (n+3)
2
(n+5)(n+1)
, which is lower than 4=3 for n > 1. Regardless of the degree of product
di¤erentiation, the ratio (n; ) always converges to 1 for n! +1:
lim
n!+1
(n; ) = 1:

Proof of Proposition 4. (i)-(ii) By expressions (4.2), (4.6) and by Bertrand equilibrium
property, when goods are homogeneous ( = 1) no di¤erence occurs between mixed and pure
oligopoly equilibrium prices, since pk = p

j = p

h = c:When goods are independent ( = 0) all
PMFs behave as monopolists under both pure and mixed oligopolies, with ph = pk =
a+ c
2
whereas, also in this case, Coops behave as perfectly competitive rms, setting pj = c.
Moreover, for  2 (0; 1)
(6.3) (pk   ph) =
(  c) (1  )m
(2 +  (n+m  3)) (2 +  (n  3)) ;
which is zero for m = 0 and monotonically increasing in the number of Coops, since
d (pk   ph)
dm
=
(1  ) (  c) 
(2 +  (n+m  3))2 > 0
for n  1: For  2 (1=1  n; 0), (6.3) becomes negative and result (ii) is thus established.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i)-(ii) Note that, for  = 0
xk (p) = xh (p
) =
1
2
(  c)
and, for every j-th Coop,
(6.4) xj (p;  = 0) = (  c)
and therefore
xj (p
;  = 0) > xh (p;  = 0) = xk (p;  = 0) :
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Moreover, for  = 1 in all types of oligopoly the same quantities are chosen with
xk (p;  = 1) = xh (p
;  = 1) = xj (p;  = 1) =
(  c)
n
:
When  2 (0; 1), a simple inspection of (??) and (4.7) shows that, for m  1,
xk (p) > xh (p
) ;
while for  2 (1=1  n; 0) the opposite holds and
xh (p
) > xk (p) :
Finally, we see that
xj (p
)  xk (p) = ( (3n m  5) + 
2 (2m  4n+ 3 mn+ n2) + 2) (  c)
(2 +  (n+m  3)) (1 +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))
whose both numerator and denominator are strictly positive for  2 (1=1  n; 1) : 
Proof of Proposition 6. By (4.9), the welfare raised by a Coop is higher than that
raised by a PMF whenever
(2 +  (2n  3))
(2 +  (n+m  3)) >
(3 +  (n+m  4)) (1 +  (n  2))
(2 +  (n+m  3))2
implying
(2 +  (2n  3)) (2 +  (n+m  3)) > (1 +  (n  2)) (3 +  (n+m  4))
which holds if m  n and  2 (1=(1  n); 1]. 
Welfare under Cournot Competition
By symmetry of all j-th Coop and all h-th PMF, the welfare raised in a mixed Cournot
oligopoly can be expressed as
TWMO = (n m) (  c)xh   12  x2h + mxjxh + (n m  1)x2h +
+m

(  c)xj   12
 
x2j +  (n m)xjxh + (m  1)x2j

+ y:
Plugging (3.8) and (3.9) into the above expression, mixed oligopoly welfare is obtained as
in (3.17). For m = 0 (3.17) becomes
TW PMF =
1
2
n (  c)2 (3 +  (n  1))
(2 +  (n  1))2 + y;
which is pure PMF oligopoly welfare. For m = n, (3.17) turns into
TWCOOP =
1
2
n (  c)2
1 +  (n  1) + ey;
i.e., pure Coop oligopoly welfare. In the specic case in which goods are homogeneous
( = 1), the above expression becomes:
TWCOOP ( = 1) =
1
2
(  c)2 + ey;
which is also the maximum welfare obtainable in the market for  = 1.
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Welfare under Bertrand Competition
The welfare under a mixed Bertrand oligopoly can be obtained as
TWMOp = (n m)

(  c)xh (p)  12x2h (p) + mxj (p)xh (p)+
+(n m  1)x2h (p)

+m [(  c)xj (p) 
 1
2
 
x2j (p
) +  (n m)xj (p)xh (p) + (m  1)x2j (p)

+ y(p);
which, using (4.7) and (4.8), yields
(6.5) TWMOp =
1
2
(n m)(a c)2(3+(n+m 4))(1+(n 2))
(2+(n+m 3))2(1+(n 1)) +
1
2
m( c)2(2+(2n 3))
(1+(n 1))(2+(n+m 3)) + y(p
):
A welfare comparison between Bertrand (6.5) and Cournot welfare (3.17) for (a  c) = 1,
yields the following expression:
TWMOp   TWMOq = 12
(6 2m 2n 2+n2 4)(n m)(n 1)(1+(m 1))( 1)2
(2+(n+m 3))2(m 3+n+2 n2+2)2(1+(n 1)) ;
which, under duopoly (n = 2) becomes
(6.6) TWMOp   TWMOq = (
4 2 2)2
(+2)2( 2)2(+1) ;
when m = 0 (pure PMF duopoly) and
(6.7) TWMOp   TWMOq = 18 (+2)( 2)( 1)
2
(2 2)2(+1)
when m = 1 (mixed duopoly). Firstly it is worth noticing that both expressions (6.6) and
(6.7) are not monotonic in . Moreover, welfare di¤erences between price and quantity
competition are generally larger under a pure PMF duopoly than under a mixed duopoly.
In both cases, such a di¤erence is high when goods are complements. When goods are
substitutes, in a pure PMF duopoly the welfare di¤erence between Bertand and Cournot
increases with , and only when  is close to one does it start to decrease. Conversely, in
a mixed duopoly such a di¤erence rst increases and then decreases to eventually disappear
for  = 1. These qualitative results also hold for n > 2.
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